Purpose

This paper investigates the role of board independence in determining the relationship between firm ownership and auditor choice.

Design/methodology/approach

The research uses a logistic regression to test the direct and indirect effects of ownership structure on the decision to hire a high-quality (Big 4) audit firm. The sample consists of 207 non-financial firms listed on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries stock markets between 2009 and 2016.

Findings

Empirical findings show that family ownership is associated with a negative and significant coefficient suggesting that an increase in family ownership decreases the likelihood that the firm will employ a Big 4 auditor. This finding suggests that family owners are reluctant to impose external monitoring. Furthermore, we find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and auditor choice supporting the conjecture that institutional investors are more likely to choose a Big 4 auditor. The results also reveal that the effects of family and institutional ownership on auditor choice are partially mediated by independent directors.

Practical implications

This study has important implications for GCC economies whose policymakers and regulators may need to address the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. It provides guidance for firms in the construction and implementation of their own corporate governance policies. Furthermore, the study findings may be useful to investors, assisting them in making better informed decisions and aids other interested parties in gaining a better understanding of the role played by ownership structure in the quality of auditors. Finally, the paper highlights the importance of the composition of the board of directors in increasing the likelihood of hiring a high-quality audit firm.

Originality/value

The main contribution of the present paper is to examine the board composition as a potential mediating variable between ownership structure and auditor choice. Moreover, it highlights the issue of improving governance mechanisms.

中文翻译：

---

所有权结构、董事会独立性和审计师选择：来自海湾合作委员会国家的证据

目的

本文研究了董事会独立性在确定公司所有权和审计师选择之间关系中的作用。

设计/方法/方法

该研究使用逻辑回归来测试所有权结构对聘请高质量（四大）审计公司的决定的直接和间接影响。样本包括 2009 年至 2016 年间在海湾合作委员会 (GCC) 国家股票市场上市的 207 家非金融公司。

发现

实证研究结果表明，家族所有权与一个负数且显着的系数相关，这表明家族所有权的增加会降低公司雇用四大审计师的可能性。这一发现表明，家庭所有者不愿进行外部监督。此外，我们发现机构所有权和审计师选择之间存在正相关关系，这支持了机构投资者更有可能选择四大审计师的猜想。结果还表明，家族和机构所有权对审计师选择的影响部分由独立董事调节。

实际影响

这项研究对 GCC 经济体具有重要意义，因为这些经济体的政策制定者和监管机构可能需要解决控股股东和非控股股东之间的冲突。它为公司制定和实施自己的公司治理政策提供了指导。此外，研究结果可能对投资者有用，有助于他们做出更明智的决策，并帮助其他相关方更好地了解所有权结构在审计师质量中所起的作用。最后，本文强调了董事会的组成在增加聘请高质量审计公司的可能性方面的重要性。

原创性/价值

本文的主要贡献是将董事会构成作为所有权结构和审计师选择之间的潜在中介变量进行检验。此外，它突出了完善治理机制的问题。