How do parties motivate candidates to exert effort in closed-list elections, where seat outcomes are uncertain only for candidates in marginal list positions? We argue that parties can solve this moral hazard problem by committing ex ante to allocate higher offices in government, such as cabinet portfolios, monotonically with list rank. Under this schedule of compensation, parties have incentives to rank candidates in order of quality (under some conditions) and candidates have incentives to increase the volume and geo-diversity of their campaign efforts as their rank improves. Using detailed data on Norwegian candidates and their use of mass and social media in recent elections, we confirm that (1) candidate quality increases with list rank, and (2) candidates in safer ranks shift from intra-district to extra-district and national media exposure—a composition of effort that can increase their party’s chance of entering government, and thus their own potential share of the spoils.

政党如何激励候选人在封闭名单选举中付出努力，在这种选举中，只有处于边缘名单位置的候选人才能确定席位结果？我们认为，政党可以通过事前承诺在政府中分配更高的职位，例如内​​阁组合，与名单排名单调，来解决这个道德风险问题。在此补偿计划下，政党有动力按质量顺序对候选人进行排名（在某些条件下），并且候选人有动力随着排名的提高而增加其竞选活动的数量和地域多样性。使用有关挪威候选人的详细数据以及他们在最近的选举中使用大众媒体和社交媒体的情况，我们确认 (1) 候选人质量随着名单排名而提高，