The hypothesis of a single deterministic price structure in the art market is unrealistic because of price dispersion, heterogeneity, limited information, and a lack of price transparency. Considerable price heterogeneity is associated with differences in quality; however, objective measurement of artistic quality is difficult, which reinforces the problem of lack of transparency in the art market. Applying finite mixture models to a sample of Surrealism paintings sold at auctions during 1990–2007, we test the hypothesis that the art market's lack of transparency is transferred to the art price system, which results in a fragmented market, characterized by the coexistence of different segments with various informational requirements, rules, and prices. Indeed, we find three distinct segments in the high end of the market, each with its own price structure. Furthermore, we identify a direct and an indirect effect on hammer prices exerted by the leading art auction houses.

由于价格分散、异质性、信息有限以及缺乏价格透明度，艺术品市场中单一确定性价格结构的假设是不切实际的。相当大的价格异质性与质量差异有关；然而，艺术质量的客观衡量是困难的，这加剧了艺术市场缺乏透明度的问题。将有限混合模型应用于 1990 年至 2007 年在拍卖会上出售的超现实主义绘画样本，我们检验了艺术市场缺乏透明度转移到艺术价格体系的假设，这导致市场碎片化，其特点是不同具有各种信息要求、规则和价格的细分市场。事实上，我们在高端市场发现了三个不同的细分市场，每个都有自己的价格结构。此外，我们确定了主要艺术品拍卖行对锤子价格的直接和间接影响。