We investigate whether and, if so, how stakeholder orientation affects the value of cash holdings by disciplining inefficient management and reducing agency costs. In so doing, we exploit the staggered enactment of constituency statutes across different states as an exogenous shock that increases the degree of stakeholder orientation substantially. Specifically, we gauge the monitoring effect of stakeholders by using the market value of cash framework of Faulkender and Wang (2006). We find that on average the marginal value of cash holdings increases significantly, both statistically and economically, after the passage of constituency statutes. The effect of constituency statutes on the value of cash holdings is stronger for firms with relatively weaker stakeholder power, high agency costs, and high information asymmetry. In subsequent tests, we show that investment efficiency in M&As and capital expenditures has improved significantly after the adoption of constituency statutes suggesting that heightened stakeholder monitoring over investments is a potential channel to enhance the value of cash holdings. Overall, our results suggest that stakeholder orientation increases the value of cash holdings by mitigating agency problems.

我们通过约束低效管理和降低代理成本来调查利益相关者导向是否以及如何影响现金持有的价值。在这样做时，我们利用不同州的选区法规的交错颁布作为外生冲击，大大增加了利益相关者的导向程度。具体而言，我们利用Faulkender and Wang (2006) 的现金市场价值框架来衡量利益相关者的监控效果。我们发现，平均而言，在选区法规通过后，现金持有的边际价值在统计上和经济上都显着增加。对于利益相关者权力相对较弱、代理成本高和信息不对称程度高的公司，选区法规对现金持有价值的影响更大。在随后的测试中，我们表明，在通过选区法规后，并购和资本支出的投资效率显着提高，这表明加强利益相关者对投资的监督是提高现金持有价值的潜在渠道。总的来说，我们的结果表明，利益相关者导向通过减轻代理问题来增加现金持有的价值。