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Study on the incentive and coordination mechanism of tumor healthcare alliance based on evolutionary game
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization ( IF 0.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-29 , DOI: 10.1007/s10878-021-00763-9
Gengjun Gao , Zhen Wu , Shuyun Wang

The healthcare alliance (HA) of malignant tumor specialist can promote the integration and development of tumor medical resources and play an important role in safeguarding people’s health. Nevertheless, conflicting interests between the involved stakeholders in the alliance impede the implementation of HA with effect. This paper divided the study of incentive coordination mechanism of supply chain in HA into two basic games, that is, under the government and medical insurance institution intervention, we respectively constructed the evolutionary game model between the tumor HA and patients, tertiary hospitals (TH) and member hospitals (MH) that are low utilized (eg. Secondary and Primary hospitals) within the alliance. Then the evolutionary stable strategies for two participants of each game are discussed and the influence of key parameters on the evolution trajectory are analyzed. Finally, numerical simulations are conducted to verify the theoretical results. The results found that “differentiated reimbursement rates for medical insurance”, “increasing government subsidies”, “enhancing the reputational impact of the different strategies of the HA” and “reducing the support costs of HA to MH” are conducive to improving primary medical service capabilities and guiding patients to go to PH for the first diagnosis. In addition, “increasing government subsidies”, “reducing sharing spillover effect caused by unilateral cooperation” and “reducing the costs of cooperation” can promote both sides to collaborate with each other to form a community of interests. Moreover, the initial strategy proportion of stakeholders would affect the evolutionary trajectories.



中文翻译:

基于进化博弈的肿瘤医疗联盟激励与协调机制研究

恶性肿瘤专科医疗联盟(HA)可以促进肿瘤医疗资源的整合和发展,在保障人民健康方面发挥重要作用。然而,联盟中涉及的利益相关者之间的利益冲突阻碍了 HA 的有效实施。本文将医管局供应链激励协调机制研究分为两个基本博弈,即在政府和医保机构干预下,分别构建肿瘤医管局与患者、三级医院(TH)之间的演化博弈模型。联盟内利用率低的成员医院(MH)(例如二级和初级医院)。然后讨论了每个博弈的两个参与者的进化稳定策略,并分析了关键参数对进化轨迹的影响。最后,进行数值模拟以验证理论结果。结果发现,“差别化医保报销率”、“增加政府补贴”、“提升医管局不同策略的声誉影响”、“降低医管局对MH的支持成本”有利于改善基层医疗服务。能力,并指导患者到 PH 进行首次诊断。此外,“增加政府补贴”、“减少单边合作带来的共享溢出效应”、“降低合作成本”,可以促进双方合作,形成利益共同体。而且,

更新日期:2021-06-30
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