ABSTRACT

Ride-sourcing, the use of private cars to provide on-demand mobility services, first appeared in San Francisco around the year 2010. Since then, transportation network companies (TNCs) who offer ride-sourcing services have expanded all around the world. By examining three case cities (San Francisco, Mexico City, Paris) we explain what facilitated this growth and how the regulation of TNCs differs. Subsequently, an economic analysis discusses the current expansionary strategy of TNCs and their future. We show that TNCs adapt their strategies to local contexts, with first priority to establish themselves in the market, if necessary, using gray regulatory areas, even if they face resistance from city authorities, taxi drivers and other groups, and despite being unprofitable. Our economic model explains this. We show that an unregulated ride-sourcing market leads to monopolistic situations once autonomous vehicles become available. We hence conclude that city authorities need to develop a regulatory framework to maximize social welfare.

摘要

拼车，即使用私家车提供按需出行服务，于 2010 年左右首次出现在旧金山。从那时起，提供拼车服务的交通网络公司 (TNC) 已遍布全球。通过考察三个案例城市（旧金山、墨西哥城、巴黎），我们解释了是什么促进了这种增长以及跨国公司的监管有何不同。随后，经济分析讨论了跨国公司当前的扩张战略及其未来。我们表明，跨国公司根据当地情况调整其战略，优先考虑在市场上建立自己，如有必要，使用灰色监管区域，即使他们面临来自城市当局、出租车司机和其他团体的抵制，尽管无利可图。我们的经济模型解释了这一点。我们表明，一旦自动驾驶汽车问世，不受监管的拼车市场会导致垄断局面。因此，我们得出结论，市政当局需要制定监管框架以最大限度地提高社会福利。