Purpose

This study explores the effect of CEO power on earnings quality. If powerful CEOs make the information environment more opaque, they can easily conceal information to hide self-dealing behavior through earnings manipulation. Conversely, if powerful CEOs who are well-protected create a transparent information environment, they will provide better quality earnings.

Design/methodology/approach

The author constructs a composite index for CEO power by combining seven CEO characteristics and employs two variables including discretionary accruals and earnings response coefficient as proxies for earnings quality.

Findings

The author’s main results show a significant negative relation between CEO power and the firm's earnings quality. In addition, CEOs with stronger structural power and expert power are more likely to generate lower earnings quality, while those with stronger ownership power are more likely to provide higher earnings quality.

Originality/value

The findings suggest that CEO power reduces the firm's earnings quality because CEOs with structural power or expert power may destroy governance monitoring mechanisms.

中文翻译：

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强大的 CEO 和盈利质量

目的

本研究探讨了 CEO 权力对盈利质量的影响。如果有权力的 CEO 使信息环境更加不透明，他们可以很容易地通过操纵盈利来隐藏信息以隐藏自我交易行为。相反，如果受到良好保护的强大 CEO 创造了一个透明的信息环境，他们将提供更好的收益质量。

设计/方法/方法

作者结合七个 CEO 特征构建了一个 CEO 权力综合指数，并采用了两个变量，包括可自由支配的应计费用和盈余响应系数作为盈余质量的代理。

发现

作者的主要研究结果表明，CEO 权力与公司盈利质量之间存在显着的负相关关系。此外，具有较强结构性权力和专家权力的CEO更有可能产生较低的盈利质量，而拥有较强所有权权力的CEO更有可能提供较高的盈利质量。

原创性/价值

研究结果表明，CEO 权力降低了公司的盈利质量，因为具有结构性权力或专家权力的 CEO 可能会破坏治理监督机制。