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Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market
Mathematical Social Sciences ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-29 , DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.06.001
Xingtang Wang , Leonard F.S. Wang

In this paper, we analyze the influence of the delegation of downstream firms that produce different quality of products on the profits, consumer surplus and social welfare in a vertically related market. We find that whether it is price or quantity competition, the delegation can enable the downstream firms to grab the profits from their input suppliers. A downstream firm that produces a high-quality product earns more from suppliers than that producing a low-quality product; however, the delegation of downstream firms brings about the reduction of consumer surplus and social welfare. Further analysis has revealed that delegation adopted by downstream firms reverses their profit comparisons under different competitive modes; that is, the downstream firms produce higher profits under quantity competition without delegation while possessing higher profits under price competition with delegation.



中文翻译:

垂直相关市场中的垂直产品差异化、管理授权和社会福利

在本文中,我们分析了在垂直相关市场中生产不同质量产品的下游企业的委托对利润、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。我们发现,无论是价格竞争还是数量竞争,委托都可以使下游企业从他们的投入品供应商那里攫取利润。生产高质量产品的下游企业比生产低质量产品的下游企业从供应商那里赚得更多;然而,下游企业的委托带来了消费者剩余和社会福利的减少。进一步分析发现,下游企业采用的委托,在不同的竞争模式下,其利润比较发生逆转;也就是说,下游企业在没有数量竞争的情况下产生更高的利润委托的价格竞争下拥有更高的利润。

更新日期:2021-07-14
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