In this paper, I distinguish between two kinds of knowledge of other minds: a propositional kind, whereby one may say, for example, that “We can see that he is in pain,” and an objectual (object-related) kind which seems to be presupposed by knowledge claims about, for example, his present feeling of pain. I will suggest that two sceptical problems arise in connection with these two kinds of knowledge, respectively. The burden of my argument will be to show that while scepticism about propositional knowledge may be amenable to a satisfactory solution, the only route to take with scepticism about objectual knowledge is dissolution.

中文翻译：

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对其他思想的怀疑：命题和客观

在这篇论文中，我区分了两种关于他人心灵的知识：一种是命题类型，例如，人们可以说“我们可以看到他在痛苦中”，另一种是客观的（与对象相关的），似乎以知识主张为前提，例如，他目前的痛苦感觉。我将建议分别与这两种知识有关的两个怀疑问题。我论证的重点是表明，虽然对命题知识的怀疑可能会得到令人满意的解决方案，但对客观知识持怀疑态度的唯一途径是分解。