Abstract

We examine the lack of planning in CEO successions and its effect on shareholder wealth for 162 cases of no succession planning. We attribute the lack of potential or actual permanent replacement at the time of the announcement of departure or actual departure of the CEO to the great need for an outsider selection to lead the company. Our findings suggest that the effect of relaxing the time constraint to choose a successor is mixed. An increase in shareholders wealth will reward boards that are able to select an outsider. Companies that appoint an insider after an interim period have a poorer performance than companies that appoint an insider in an orderly succession process. We find that the lack of succession planning does not affect long term performance if boards are willing to put effort towards selecting the most suitable candidates.

摘要

我们研究了 162 例没有继任计划的 CEO 继任计划缺乏计划及其对股东财富的影响。我们将在 CEO 宣布离职或实际离职时缺乏潜在或实际永久替代人选归因于非常需要外部人选来领导公司。我们的研究结果表明，放宽时间限制以选择继任者的效果好坏参半。股东财富的增加将奖励能够选择局外人的董事会。在过渡期之后任命内部人的公司的业绩比在有序继任过程中任命内部人的公司要差。我们发现，如果董事会愿意努力选择最合适的候选人，则缺乏继任计划不会影响长期绩效。