ABSTRACT

Many of our common-sense moral judgments seemingly imply the existence of moral luck. I attempt to avoid moral luck while retaining most of these judgments. I defend a view on which agents have moral equality of opportunity. This allows us to account for our anti-moral-luck intuitions at less cost than has been previously recognized.

中文翻译：

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平等的道德机会：道德运气问题的解决方案

摘要

我们的许多常识性道德判断似乎都暗示着道德运气的存在。我试图在保留大部分这些判断的同时避免道德上的运气。我为代理人在道德上机会平等的观点辩护。这使我们能够以比以前认识的更低的成本来解释我们的反道德运气直觉。