Abstract This paper examines the impact of audit quality on earnings management through loan loss provisions among both conventional and Islamic banks operating in MENA countries. Using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Random Effects, we found that Big-4, Co-audit, audit committee size, and audit committee independence restrain earnings management practices of Islamic bank managers. In contrast, audit committee mechanisms do not influence earnings management practices in conventional banks. We also found that the extent of earnings management is lower in Islamic banks operating in countries experiencing turmoil as compared to conventional banks. Using the T-test and the Wilcoxon Signed-ranks, we found that the audit quality in conventional banks is lower compared to Islamic banks. Our findings have implications for policymakers since it helps them to enhance the regulations regarding audit quality and accounting standards. It also provides helpful insights into the determinants of earnings management in both conventional and Islamic banks operating in MENA countries.

中文翻译：

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贷款损失准备金和审计质量：来自中东和北非伊斯兰银行和传统银行的证据

摘要 本文通过在 MENA 国家运营的传统银行和伊斯兰银行的贷款损失准备金，研究了审计质量对盈余管理的影响。使用广义矩量法 (GMM) 和随机效应，我们发现四大、共同审计、审计委员会规模和审计委员会独立性限制了伊斯兰银行经理的盈余管理实践。相比之下，审计委员会机制不会影响传统银行的盈余管理实践。我们还发现，与传统银行相比，在经历动荡的国家运营的伊斯兰银行的盈余管理程度较低。使用 T 检验和 Wilcoxon Signed-ranks，我们发现传统银行的审计质量低于伊斯兰银行。我们的发现对政策制定者有影响，因为它有助于他们加强有关审计质量和会计标准的法规。它还提供了有关在 MENA 国家运营的传统银行和伊斯兰银行盈余管理决定因素的有用见解。