In recent decades, the logical study of rational belief dynamics has played an increasingly important role in philosophy. However, the dynamics of concepts such as conceptual learning received comparatively little attention within this debate. This is problematic insofar as the occurrence of conceptual change (especially in the sciences) has been an influential argument against a merely logical analysis of beliefs. Especially Kuhn’s ideas about the incommensurability, i.e., untranslatability, of succeeding theories seem to stand in the way of logical reconstruction. This paper investigates conceptual change as model-changing operations similar to belief revision and relates it to the notion of incommensurability. I consider several versions of conceptual change and discuss their influences on the expressive power, translatability and the potential arising of incommensurability. The paper concludes with a discussion of animal taxonomy in Aristotle’s and Linnaeus’s work.

近几十年来，理性信念动力学的逻辑研究在哲学中发挥了越来越重要的作用。然而，概念学习等概念的动态在这场辩论中受到的关注相对较少。这是有问题的，因为概念变化的发生（尤其是在科学中）一直是反对对信念进行逻辑分析的有影响力的论点。尤其是库恩关于后继理论的不可通约性，即不可译性的观点，似乎阻碍了逻辑重构。本文将概念变化作为类似于信念修正的模型更改操作进行研究，并将其与不可通约性的概念联系起来。我考虑了概念变化的几个版本，并讨论了它们对表达能力的影响，可译性和不可通约性的潜在产生。本文最后讨论了亚里士多德和林奈著作中的动物分类学。