The Heidegger–Deleuze relationship has attracted significant attention of late. This paper contributes to this line of research by examining Deleuze’s claim, recently reiterated and developed by Philip Tonner, that Heidegger offers a univocal conception of Being where there is one sense of Being that is said throughout all entities. Although these authors maintain that this claim holds across Heidegger’s oeuvre, I purposefully adopt a conservative hermeneutical strategy that focuses on two writings from the 1927–1928 period—Being and Time and the following year’s lecture course translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic—and emphasize the lesson of the ontological difference that Being is always the Being of an entity, to argue that with regards to these texts, at least, an alternative equivocal interpretation is possible in which Being is always said differently. The conclusion draws out the implications of this for the relationship between Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and Deleuze’s differential ontology.

海德格尔与德勒兹的关系近来引起了极大的关注。本文通过检查最近由菲利普·托纳 (Philip Tonner) 重申和发展的德勒兹 (Deleuze) 的主张，对这一研究方向做出了贡献，即海德格尔提供了一种单一的存在概念，其中存在一种贯穿所有实体的存在感。尽管这些作者坚持认为这一主张适用于海德格尔的全部作品，但我有目的地采用了一种保守的解释学策略，侧重于 1927 年至 1928 年时期的两部著作——《存在与时间》以及第二年被翻译为《逻辑的形而上学基础》的讲座课程——并强调存在始终是一个实体的存在的本体论差异的教训，以争辩说，对于这些文本，至少，存在另一种模棱两可的解释是可能的，其中存在总是以不同的方式表达。结论引出了这对海德格尔基本本体论与德勒兹差异本体论之间关系的启示。