Many microfinance institutions (MFIs) use dynamic incentives in combination with progressive lending schemes to reduce defaults. However, the specific role of progressive lending has never been tested empirically, while observational evidence in other contexts points to potentially adverse effects. Using an experimental approach, we study the impact of progressive lending on overborrowing, attending to the possibility that progressive lending may actually increase liquidity defaults. We organize a framed field experiment in the municipality of Coroico, Bolivia, inviting 271 members of an MFI to participate in an experimental game. In Bolivia, the penetration rates of microfinance are among the highest in the world, progressive lending systems are a common practice, and the concept and practices of microfinance are well known among most people. We find that participants who borrowed over multiple rounds with progressively increasing borrowing caps showed increased liquidity defaults once the caps became unconstraining compared to those without progressive lending. We speculate that this result stems from anchoring borrowing loan requests on the credit limit set by the lender and formalize this rationale in a model for credit demand and naive borrowers. MFIs should consider the potential perverse anchoring effects of progressive lending when designing policies aimed at reducing overborrowing.

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小额信贷中的流动性违约和渐进式贷款：玻利维亚的现场实验室实验

许多小额信贷机构 (MFI) 结合使用动态激励措施和渐进式贷款计划来减少违约。然而，渐进式贷款的具体作用从未经过实证检验，而在其他情况下的观察证据表明存在潜在的不利影响。我们使用实验方法研究累进贷款对过度借贷的影响，关注累进贷款实际上可能增加流动性违约的可能性。我们在玻利维亚科罗伊科市组织了一次框架式实地实验，邀请了 271 名 MFI 成员参加了一个实验游戏。在玻利维亚，小额信贷的渗透率位居世界前列，渐进式贷款制度是普遍做法，小额信贷的概念和做法为大多数人所熟知。我们发现，与那些没有渐进式贷款的参与者相比，一旦上限变得不受约束，多轮借款且借款上限逐渐增加的参与者会表现出更多的流动性违约。我们推测，这一结果源于将借贷请求锚定在贷方设定的信用额度上，并在信贷需求和幼稚借款人的模型中将这一基本原理正式化。小额信贷机构在设计旨在减少过度借贷的政策时，应考虑渐进式贷款的潜在反常锚定效应。我们推测，这一结果源于将借贷请求锚定在贷方设定的信用额度上，并在信贷需求和幼稚借款人的模型中将这一基本原理正式化。小额信贷机构在设计旨在减少过度借贷的政策时，应考虑渐进式贷款的潜在反常锚定效应。我们推测，这一结果源于将借贷请求锚定在贷方设定的信用额度上，并在信贷需求和幼稚借款人的模型中将这一基本原理正式化。小额信贷机构在设计旨在减少过度借贷的政策时，应考虑渐进式贷款的潜在反常锚定效应。