Fishing systems provide employment, income generation, poverty alleviation, and food security. The coexistence of small-scale fisheries (SSFs) and large-scale fisheries (LSFs) increases management complexity. Management actions have ecological and social implications that must be addressed carefully. We applied a bioeconomic game-theoretical model to the four-gear mullet fishery in southern Brazil—one industrial LSF (purse seine) and three artisanal SSFs (gillnet, beach seine, and drift net). All fishing gears target adult individuals during mullet's reproductive migration. First, we explored whether the current fishing efforts of all fishing gears could persist over time. Second, we investigated their interactions through a non-cooperative game. Finally, we studied the response of these interactions when fishing effort was restricted. We found that when the current fishing effort was maintained, the stock reduced to 26.4% of its capacity in 25 years. In addition, under non-cooperation, the traditional beach seine fleet exited the fishery. Interestingly, the constrained scenario had a coexistence output with increasing values for the final stock size and the per capita labour income, suggesting that limiting fishing effort can maintain all fishing gears in the fishery with social and ecological benefits.

中文翻译：

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在并存的小型和大型渔业博弈中管理捕捞努力的生物经济效益

渔业系统提供就业、创收、减贫和粮食安全。小规模渔业（SSFs）和大规模渔业（LSFs）的共存增加了管理的复杂性。管理行动具有必须认真处理的生态和社会影响。我们将生物经济博弈论模型应用于巴西南部的四档鲻鱼渔业——一个工业 LSF（围网）和三个手工 SSF（刺网、海滩围网和流网）。在鲻鱼的繁殖迁徙过程中，所有渔具都以成年个体为目标。首先，我们探讨了当前所有渔具的捕捞努力是否会随着时间的推移而持续下去。其次，我们通过非合作博弈研究了他们的互动。最后，我们研究了当捕捞努力受到限制时这些相互作用的反应。我们发现，在维持当前捕捞量的情况下，25 年内库存量减少到其容量的 26.4%。此外，在不合作的情况下，传统的海滩围网船队退出了渔业。有趣的是，受限情景的产出与最终种群规模和人均劳动收入的值增加并存，这表明限制捕捞努力可以保持渔业中的所有渔具具有社会和生态效益。