当前位置: X-MOL 学术Managerial and Decision Economics › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Principal–agent models where a principal is only affected by extreme performances
Managerial and Decision Economics ( IF 2.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-27 , DOI: 10.1002/mde.3394
Yigal Gerchak 1 , Christian Schmid 2
Affiliation  

We consider an independent agents setting, where only the highest or lowest achievement affects the principal. An example of highest achievement scenario is the output of parallel research and development (R&D) teams, when only the highest/best achievement matters. An example of lowest achievement could be an assembly system, where the number of product units that can be assembled equals the lowest number of adequate parts of any component. The findings show that when only extreme performances matter, a principal employs weaker incentives for multiple agents. Furthermore, the reward parameter is especially small if only the lowest achievement is relevant.

中文翻译:

委托人仅受极端表现影响的委托代理模型

我们考虑一个独立的代理设置,只有最高或最低的成就会影响委托人。最高成就场景的一个例子是平行研发 (R&D) 团队的产出,此时只有最高/最佳成就很重要。最低成就的一个例子可能是组装系统,其中可以组装的产品单元的数量等于任何组件的适当零件的最低数量。研究结果表明,当只有极端表现很重要时,委托人对多个代理人采用较弱的激励措施。此外,如果只有最低成就相关,则奖励参数特别小。
更新日期:2021-06-27
down
wechat
bug