Purpose

Responding to the store brand (SB) introduction by the retailer, the manufacturer may adopt the strategic choice of incorporating the fairness concern behavior of the retailer. This paper aims to examine how the manufacturer can counteract the retailer’s SB introduction by strategically choosing to or not to incorporating the retailer’s fairness concern.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper considers the SB introduction problem in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer with fairness concern behavior. This paper resolves the pricing strategies under four strategic scenarios regarding fairness concern incorporation and SB introduction and examine the influences from the fairness concern on pricing strategies and profits. This paper further investigates the strategic choice equilibrium of the manufacturer and retailer on fairness concern and SB introduction decision.

Findings

The results show that the retailer can be better off by the introduction of the SB only when the acceptance degree of the SB is high enough. And whether the manufacturer should incorporate the retailer's fairness concern depends on the consumer's acceptance of the SB: Only when the consumer's acceptance is moderate, the manufacturer is able to counteract the SB by strategically not incorporating the retailer’s fairness concern behavior. Otherwise, the manufacturer cannot prevent the retailer from introducing the SB and can be better off by incorporating the retailer’s fairness concern behavior.

Originality/value

This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether the manufacturer can adopt the strategic incorporation of the retailer's fairness concern to counteract the retailer's SB introduction.

中文翻译：

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公平关注行为的战略整合对抗门店品牌引进

目的

响应于零售商引入商店品牌（SB），制造商可能会采取纳入零售商公平关注行为的战略选择。本文旨在研究制造商如何通过战略性地选择是否纳入零售商的公平关注来抵消零售商的 SB 引入。

设计/方法/方法

本文考虑了具有公平关注行为的由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链中的 SB 引入问题。本文解决了公平关注纳入和SB引入的四种战略情景下的定价策略，并考察了公平关注对定价策略和利润的影响。本文进一步研究了制造商和零售商在公平关注和SB引入决策上的战略选择均衡。

发现

结果表明，只有当SB的接受度足够高时，零售商才能通过引入SB而变得更好。而制造商是否应该纳入零售商的公平关切取决于消费者对SB的接受程度：只有当消费者的接受程度适中时，制造商才能通过战略性地不纳入零售商的公平关切行为来抵消SB。否则，制造商无法阻止零售商引入 SB，并且可以通过纳入零售商的公平关注行为来获得更好的收益。

原创性/价值

本文通过研究制造商是否可以采用零售商公平关注的战略合并来抵消零售商的 SB 引入，从而为文献做出贡献。