Purpose

This paper examines the effect of managerial insider trading on analyst forecast accuracy, dispersion and bias. Specifically, the authors test whether insider-trading information is positively associated with the precision of earnings forecasts. In addition, this relationship between Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) and the Galleon insider trading case is examined.

Design/methodology/approach

Pooled ordinary least squares (Pooled OLS) rregressions with year-fixed effects, firm-fixed effects, and firm-level clustered standard errors are used. Our proxies for forecast precision are regressed on alternative measures of insider trading activities and a vector of control variables.

Findings

Insider-trading information is positively associated with the precision of earnings forecasts. Analysts provide better forecast accuracy, less forecast dispersion and lower forecast bias among firms with insider trading in the six months leading to the forecast issues. In addition, bullish (bearish) insider trades are associated with increased (decreased) forecast bias. Insider trading information complements analysts' independent opinion and increases the precision of their forecast.

Practical implications

Regulators may pursue rules that promote the rapid disclosure of managerial insider trades, particularly given the increasing availability of Internet tools. Securities regulators may attempt to increase transparency and enhance the reporting procedures of corporate insiders, for example, using Internet sources with direct release to the public to ensure more timely information dissemination.

Originality/value

The authors document a positive association between earnings forecast precision and managerial insider trading up to six months prior to the forecast issue. This relationship is stronger after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prohibited the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information through Regulation FD. In addition, the association between insider trading and forecast accuracy has weakened after the Galleon insider trading case.

中文翻译：

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管理层内幕交易的信息内容：来自分析师预测的证据

目的

本文研究了管理内幕交易对分析师预测准确性、分散性和偏差的影响。具体而言，作者测试了内幕交易信息是否与盈利预测的准确性呈正相关。此外，还审查了监管公平披露 (FD) 与 Galleon 内幕交易案件之间的这种关系。

设计/方法/方法

使用具有年份固定效应、企业固定效应和企业级聚类标准误差的合并普通最小二乘法 (Pooled OLS) 回归。我们对预测精度的代理是根据内幕交易活动的替代措施和控制变量向量进行回归的。

发现

内幕交易信息与盈利预测的准确性呈正相关。分析师在导致预测问题的六个月内进行内幕交易的公司之间提供更好的预测准确性、更少的预测偏差和更低的预测偏差。此外，看涨（看跌）内幕交易与增加（减少）预测偏差有关。内幕交易信息补充了分析师的独立意见并提高了他们预测的准确性。

实际影响

监管机构可能会制定促进管理层内幕交易快速披露的规则，尤其是在互联网工具日益普及的情况下。证券监管机构可能会尝试提高透明度并加强公司内部人员的报告程序，例如，使用直接向公众发布的互联网资源，以确保更及时地发布信息。

原创性/价值

作者记录了在预测发布前六个月的盈利预测准确性和管理内幕交易之间的正相关关系。在美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 通过法规 FD 禁止选择性披露重大非公开信息之后，这种关系更加牢固。此外，在 Galleon 内幕交易案之后，内幕交易与预测准确性之间的联系有所减弱。