We use a unique data set that comprises each Euro area bank’s daily recourse to the ECB’s marginal lending facility (MLF) and all its bids placed in the ECB’s main refinancing operations (MROs) that were conducted as variable rate tenders until October 2008. We show that the more aggressive a bank bids in a MRO, the higher is its propensity to subsequently draw on the MLF. Our results indicate that particularly with the beginning of the financial crisis, the interest rate paid by a bank in a variable rate tender auction strongly reflects its private value for liquidity, i.e. its opportunity costs of obtaining short-term funding in money markets, and thus, the risk premium it is charged in the private market. This suggests 1) that variable rate tender auctions preserve some market discipline and contain moral hazard issues, especially in times when a central bank is extending its liquidity provision and 2) that the average interest rate paid in an auction can be a useful indicator for bank supervisors to gauge a bank’s access to liquidity in money markets.

我们使用一个独特的数据集，其中包括每个欧元区银行对欧洲央行边际贷款工具 (MLF) 的每日追索权，以及其在 2008 年 10 月之前作为浮动利率招标进行的欧洲央行主要再融资操作 (MRO) 中的所有投标。银行在 MRO 中的出价越积极，其随后利用 MLF 的倾向就越高。我们的结果表明，特别是在金融危机开始时，银行在浮动利率招标拍卖中支付的利率强烈反映了其流动性的私人价值，即其在货币市场获得短期融资的机会成本，因此，它在私人市场上收取的风险溢价。这表明 1) 可变利率招标拍卖保留了一些市场纪律并包含道德风险问题，