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SINR-based power schedule of sensors and DoS attackers in wireless network
ISA Transactions ( IF 6.3 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-26 , DOI: 10.1016/j.isatra.2021.06.033
Guangyan Xu 1 , Qiuying Sun 1 , Hao Liu 1
Affiliation  

In this paper, the game theory approaches are used to solve the power schedule problem in the wireless communication network. All sensors can be affected by DoS attackers when transmitting data. The game process between sensors and attackers is established as Bayesian game process. First, a Nash Equilibrium (NE) framework is proposed based on the object function consist of signal-to-interference-and-noise-ratio (SINR). Second, the total power of sensors is considered to have two types, and each type has some power levels. Unlike NE, both sensors and attackers no longer learn the specific total power of each other. However, sensors and attackers can get the type distribution of each other. In this situation, the strategies of sensors and attackers are formulated by introducing the Harsanyi transformation, and the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is solved. Finally, the Bayesian equilibrium strategies used by both offensive and defensive players are compared in the numerical example, which can illustrate the advantage of making full use of incomplete information.



中文翻译:

基于 SINR 的无线网络中传感器和 DoS 攻击者的功率调度

本文采用博弈论方法解决无线通信网络中的功率调度问题。所有传感器在传输数据时都可能受到 DoS 攻击者的影响。传感器和攻击者之间的博弈过程被建立为贝叶斯博弈过程。首先,基于由信干噪比(SINR)组成的目标函数,提出了纳什均衡(NE)框架。其次,传感器的总功率被认为有两种类型,每种类型都有一定的功率等级。与 NE 不同,传感器和攻击者不再了解对方的具体总功率。但是,传感器和攻击者可以得到彼此的类型分布。在这种情况下,传感器和攻击者的策略是通过引入 Harsanyi 变换来制定的,贝叶斯纳什均衡(BNE)得到解决。最后在数值例子中比较了攻守双方使用的贝叶斯均衡策略,可以说明充分利用不完全信息的优势。

更新日期:2021-06-26
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