This paper has three aims: first, to present in a clear way Newton da Costa’s argument against the necessity of logical laws. In order to do so, we need to clearly advance his views on the idea that logic is context-relative, and not known a priori. Doing so, however, requires that we present his methodology for the development of counter-examples to logical laws: the use of hypothetical models in logic. Given that this method has been overlooked in most discussions on the epistemology of logic, our second goal is to present da Costa’s views on it carefully. The discussion of some tensions resulting from the relation of a system of logic and the context it governs, in da Costa’s approach, is our third goal. Basically, da Costa seems to swing between two incompatible views on such relation, requiring sometimes that a logic is dependent on a context, and in other cases, that the nature of the context is dependent on a logic. Bringing this to light may also benefit current discussions on logical relativism.

本文有三个目的：第一，以清晰的方式呈现牛顿达科斯塔反对逻辑定律必要性的论证。为了做到这一点，我们需要清楚地提出他的观点，即逻辑是与上下文相关的，而不是先验已知的。然而，这样做需要我们提出他的方法来发展逻辑定律的反例：在逻辑中使用假设模型。鉴于这种方法在大多数关于逻辑认识论的讨论中都被忽视了，我们的第二个目标是仔细提出达科斯塔对此的看法。在达科斯塔的方法中，对逻辑系统与其所支配的上下文之间的关系所产生的一些紧张关系的讨论是我们的第三个目标。基本上，达科斯塔似乎在关于这种关系的两种不相容的观点之间摇摆不定，有时要求逻辑取决于上下文，而在其他情况下，要求上下文的性质取决于逻辑。揭示这一点也可能有益于当前关于逻辑相对主义的讨论。