This paper explores the impacts of debt restructuring on investment and financing decisions and agency problem between shareholders and creditors. Notably, a critical feature in our model is that the renegotiation in debt restructuring is credible. To do so, we develop a unified model of dynamic investment, financing and agency problem for firms with renegotiable private debt, thereby highlight the significance of debt restructuring for corporate decisions. We find that firms with lower renegotiation costs and more uncertainty on cash flows are more likely to issue private debt than public debt. Interestingly, we also discover that debt restructuring can alleviate underinvestment and weaken sharesholders’ asset substitution motives, thereby reducing the agency costs of debt. The above results provide practical implications for policymakers about improving investment and financing efficiency and avoiding the deadweight loss of social welfare.

本文探讨了债务重组对投融资决策的影响以及股东与债权人之间的代理问题。值得注意的是，我们模型的一个关键特征是债务重组的重新谈判是可信的。为此，我们为具有可再转让私人债务的公司开发了动态投融资和代理问题的统一模型，从而突出了债务重组对公司决策的重要性。我们发现，与公共债务相比，重新谈判成本较低且现金流不确定性较大的公司更有可能发行私人债务。有趣的是，我们还发现债务重组可以缓解投资不足，削弱股东的资产替代动机，从而降低债务的代理成本。