This paper investigates the drivers of provisioning in MFIs and their provisioning behaviour over the business cycle. Based on an international sample of MFIs extracted from the MIX database over the 2001–2014 period, we uncover a negative relationship between MFIs' provisioning and the business cycle. Our finding corroborates the fact that MFIs do not build their loan loss provisions (LLP) during economic booms when profit and earnings are high. Since they provision more during downturns, they are more likely to suffer from unexpected losses and experience failure. This is in sharp contrast with the current Basel III countercyclical buffer requirement suggesting that financial institutions, especially banks, should build sufficient buffer in booms so that they can avoid costly capital adjustment when the economy contracts. Deeper analyses suggest however that this behaviour mainly concerns profit-oriented and deposit-taking/regulated MFIs, with business model and target close to conventional banking. This suggests that bank-like and regulated MFIs' loan loss provisions follow similar behavioral patterns to those of the conventional banking sector during the boom-and-bust cycles.

本文调查了小额信贷机构的拨备驱动因素及其在整个商业周期中的拨备行为。根据从 2001 年至 2014 年期间从 MIX 数据库中提取的小额信贷机构的国际样本，我们发现小额信贷机构的拨备与商业周期之间存在负相关关系。我们的发现证实了这样一个事实，即小额信贷机构不会在利润和收益高的经济繁荣时期建立其贷款损失准备金 (LLP)。由于它们在经济低迷时期提供更多资金，因此它们更有可能遭受意外损失和失败。这与当前的巴塞尔协议 III 反周期缓冲要求形成鲜明对比，该要求表明金融机构，尤其是银行，应在繁荣时期建立足够的缓冲，以便在经济收缩时避免代价高昂的资本调整。然而，更深入的分析表明，这种行为主要涉及以利润为导向和接受存款/受监管的小额信贷机构，其商业模式和目标与传统银行业务接近。这表明类似银行和受监管的小额信贷机构的贷款损失准备金在繁荣与萧条周期中遵循与传统银行业相似的行为模式。