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Large bank shareholders and terms of bank loans during the global financial crisis
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting ( IF 2.808 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-25 , DOI: 10.1111/jifm.12137
Celia Álvarez‐Botas 1 , Carlos Fernández‐Méndez 1 , Víctor M. González 1
Affiliation  

This paper analyzes the influence of large bank shareholders on the terms of bank loans for a sample of 12,045 loans to 3,290 borrowers from 45 countries over the period 2004–2013. We investigate the effects of bank control over bank loan terms during the global financial crisis, regardless of whether the bank shareholder is a lender or not. In line with a monitoring effect, the results suggest that firms with bank shareholders that are non-lenders borrowed at lower interest rates and longer maturities during the period of crisis. However, borrowers paid higher spreads and were offered shorter maturities when they borrowed from banks that are also shareholders. This effect is consistent with banks obtaining private benefits as large shareholders as a consequence of the informational hold-up problems affecting borrowers.

中文翻译:

全球金融危机期间银行大股东及银行贷款条款

本文分析了大银行股东对 2004-2013 年期间来自 45 个国家的 3,290 名借款人的 12,045 笔贷款样本的银行贷款条款的影响。我们调查了全球金融危机期间银行控制银行贷款条款的影响,无论银行股东是否为贷方。与监测效应一致,结果表明,银行股东为非贷款人的公司在危机期间以较低的利率和较长的期限借款。然而,当借款人从也是股东的银行借款时,他们支付了更高的利差并获得了更短的期限。由于影响借款人的信息滞留问题,这种影响与银行作为大股东获得私人利益是一致的。
更新日期:2021-06-25
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