Communication-dependent and software-based distributed energy resources (DERs) are extensively integrated into modern microgrids, providing extensive benefits such as increased distributed controllability, scalability, and observability. However, malicious cyber-attackers can exploit various potential vulnerabilities. In this study, a programmable adaptive security scanning (PASS) approach is presented to protect DER inverters against various power-bot attacks. Specifically, three different types of attacks, namely controller manipulation, replay, and injection attacks, are considered. This approach employs both software-defined networking technique and a novel coordinated detection method capable of enabling programmable and scalable networked microgrids (NMs) in an ultra-resilient, time-saving, and autonomous manner. The coordinated detection method efficiently identifies the location and type of power-bot attacks without disrupting normal NM operations. Extensive simulation results validate the efficacy and practicality of the PASS for securing NMs.

依赖于通信和基于软件的分布式能源 (DER) 广泛集成到现代微电网中，提供了广泛的好处，例如增加了分布式可控性、可扩展性和可观察性。然而，恶意网络攻击者可以利用各种潜在的漏洞。在这项研究中，提出了一种可编程自适应安全扫描 (PASS) 方法来保护 DER 逆变器免受各种电力机器人攻击。具体来说，考虑了三种不同类型的攻击，即控制器操纵、重放和注入攻击。这种方法采用了软件定义的网络技术和一种新颖的协调检测方法，能够以超弹性、省时和自主的方式实现可编程和可扩展的联网微电网 (NM)。协调检测方法有效地识别 Power-bot 攻击的位置和类型，而不会中断正常的 NM 操作。广泛的模拟结果验证了 PASS 在保护 NM 方面的有效性和实用性。