ABSTRACT

Nowadays, almost everyone seems to agree that science is facing an epistemological crisis – namely the replicability crisis – and that we need to take action. But as to precisely what to do or how to do it, there are no firm answers. Some scholars argue that the current statistical inferential framework is inadequate and therefore we should focus on improving statistical methods. Some others claim instead that the only way to fix science is to change the scientific reward system, promoting quality rather than quantity of scientific publications. However, every positive proposal, either methodological or social, has a valid counterargument. Here I want to make explicit some reasons for explaining the persistence of disagreement on the solutions to the crisis. Focusing on issues which have been overlooked in the debate might help to better evaluate scientific reforms. With this regard, philosophical knowledge can be mobilised to take action in response to the replicability crisis.

摘要

如今，几乎每个人似乎都同意科学正面临着认识论危机——即可复制性危机——我们需要采取行动。但具体做什么、怎么做，还没有明确的答案。有学者认为，目前的统计推断框架不够完善，应重点改进统计方法。其他一些人则声称，解决科学问题的唯一方法是改变科学奖励制度，提高科学出版物的质量而不是数量。然而，每一个积极的建议，无论是方法论的还是社会的，都有一个有效的反驳。在这里，我想明确一些原因来解释在解决危机的方法上的分歧持续存在。关注辩论中被忽视的问题可能有助于更好地评估科学改革。在这方面，可以调动哲学知识采取行动应对可复制性危机。