A durable goods monopolist proposes selling mechanisms in two periods, being unable to commit in the first period on the mechanism to propose in the second. Trade is anonymous and resale is not possible. Although buyers have a continuum of possible valuations, the optimal first-period mechanism is a menu with at most two possibilities: a high price guaranteeing delivery and a low price subject to rationing. This characterization is robust to the arrival of additional buyers in the second period. The optimal mechanism is fully characterized for linear demand, with priority pricing being optimal if agents are sufficiently patient.

中文翻译：

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耐用品垄断者的最优优先定价

耐用品垄断者分两期提出销售机制，无法在第一期对第二期提出的机制作出承诺。交易是匿名的，转售是不可能的。尽管买家有一系列可能的估价，但最优的第一期机制是最多有两种可能性的菜单：高价保证交货和低价配给。这种特征对于第二阶段额外买家的到来是强有力的。最优机制完全适用于线性需求，如果座席足够耐心，优先定价是最优的。