Firm integration is fundamentally shaped by contractual frictions. But do better contracting institutions, reducing these frictions, induce firms to be more or less deeply integrated? To address this question, this paper exploits unique micro data on ownership shares across more than 200,000 firm pairs worldwide, including domestic and cross-border ownership links. We uncover a new stylized fact: Firms choose higher ownership shares in subsidiaries located in countries with better contracting institutions. We develop a Property-Rights Theory of the multinational firm featuring partial ownership that rationalizes this pattern and guides our econometric analysis. The estimations demonstrate that better contracting institutions favor deeper integration, in particular in relationship-specific industries.

企业整合从根本上是由合同摩擦塑造的。但是，更好的合同制度，减少这些摩擦，是否会促使企业或多或少地深度整合？为了解决这个问题，本文利用了全球 200,000 多个公司对所有权份额的独特微观数据，包括国内和跨境所有权联系。我们发现了一个新的程式化事实：公司选择位于拥有更好合同制度的国家的子公司的更高所有权份额。我们开发了以部分所有权为特征的跨国公司的产权理论，使这种模式合理化并指导我们的计量经济学分析。估计表明，更好的签约机构有利于更深入的整合，特别是在特定关系的行业中。