The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.

中文翻译：

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斯宾诺赞关于妄想的信念论

斯宾诺赞的信念固着理论认为，在心理上呈现适合真理的命题会导致立即相信它们。在这篇论文中，我探讨了该理论如何作为对妄想的信念论（认为它们是信念的观点）的辩护。信念主义受到批评，理由是妄想通常不遵守我们期望信念遵守的理性标准。如果信仰固着是斯宾诺桑，我认为，这些对理性的偏离不仅与他们的信仰地位相容，而且支持他们的信仰地位。