Sextus Empiricus’ definition of skepticism as a search for truth still poses great problems for research today. Perhaps the most urgent of these is: How can we reasonably assert the possibility of knowledge and at the same time deny its reality? The paper tries to solve this question by drawing attention to a hitherto neglected variant of skepticism: the so-called critical skepticism. In confrontation with Hume and Kant, Salomon Maimon develops a skeptical position which, with the help of transcendental argumentation, produces a knowing of not-knowing. Maimon defends with Kant (and against Hume) transcendental knowledge which at the same time offers a reason to reject with Hume and against Kant empirical knowledge. By doing so, he distinguishes a knowledge of possibility from a (non-)knowledge of reality, whereby the search for truth—expressed in the assumption that knowledge is possible—is and remains the only truth.

Sextus Empiricus 将怀疑论定义为对真理的追求，今天仍然给研究带来很大的问题。也许其中最紧迫的是：我们如何合理地断言知识的可能性，同时又否认它的真实性？本文试图通过提请注意迄今为止被忽视的怀疑论变体来解决这个问题：所谓的批判性怀疑论。在与休谟和康德的对抗中，所罗门迈蒙发展了一种怀疑的立场，在先验论证的帮助下，产生了一种对无知的知道。迈蒙用康德（并反对休谟）捍卫先验知识，同时提供了一个拒绝休谟和反对康德经验知识的理由。通过这样做，他将可能性知识与（非）现实知识区分开来，