This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers often assume that Moore’s response to “external world skepticism” deals exclusively with the former, not the latter. But this is a mistake. I shall argue that Moore’s anti-skeptical argument targets an ontological form of skepticism. Thus, the conclusion is an ontological claim about fundamental reality, while the premises are epistemic claims. If this is correct, then the conclusion outstrips the scope of its premises and proves too much.

本文认为我们应该拒绝 GE Moore 在“外部世界的证明”中提出的反怀疑论点。但是，我提出的理由不同于传统的反对意见。正确理解摩尔的“证明”需要注意两种形式的怀疑之间的重要区别。我称这些为本体论怀疑论和认识论怀疑论. 前者是对基本现实本体论地位的怀疑，后者是对我们的经验知识的怀疑。哲学家们常常假设摩尔对“外部世界怀疑论”的回应只针对前者，而不是后者。但这是一个错误。我将论证摩尔的反怀疑论针对怀疑论的本体论形式。因此，结论是关于基本现实的本体论断言，而前提是认识论断言。如果这是正确的，那么结论超出了其前提的范围并且证明了太多。