Charles Sanders Peirce offers a number of arguments against the rational application of theory to morality, suggesting instead that morality should be grounded in instinct. Peirce maintains that we currently lack the scientific knowledge that would justify a rational structuring of morality. This being the case, philosophically generated moralities cannot be otherwise than dogmatic and dangerous. In this paper, I contend that Peirce’s critique of what I call “dogmatic-philosophical morality” should be taken very seriously, but I also claim that the purely instinctive morality Peirce endorses is liable to a danger of its own, namely fanaticism. Indeed, Peirce himself recognizes this danger. As an alternative, I sketch a form of “pragmatic morality” that attempts to sidestep the dogmatism of philosophical morality and the fanaticism of instinctive morality. This form of morality avoids philosophical dogmatism by treating extant instincts as the postulates and materials with which it works. It avoids instinctive fanaticism by allowing a role to reason. By exhibiting fallibilism, revisability, pluralism, and meliorism, this type of reasoning can avoid the dogmatism of the philosophical kind of morality Peirce critiques.

查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔斯 (Charles Sanders Peirce) 提出了许多反对将理论合理应用于道德的论点，相反，他建议道德应该以本能为基础。Peirce 坚持认为，我们目前缺乏科学知识来证明道德的合理结构是合理的。在这种情况下，哲学产生的道德只能是教条和危险的。在这篇论文中，我认为应该非常认真地对待 Peirce 对我所谓的“教条哲学道德”的批评，但我也声称，Peirce 所认可的纯粹本能的道德很容易产生其自身的危险，即狂热。事实上，皮尔斯本人也意识到了这种危险。作为备选，我勾勒出一种“实用道德”的形式，试图回避哲学道德的教条主义和本能道德的狂热。这种道德形式通过将现存的本能视为其运作的假设和材料来避免哲学教条主义。它通过允许角色进行推理来避免本能的狂热。通过展示易错性、可修正性、多元论和优胜论，这种类型的推理可以避免皮尔士批判的哲学类道德的教条主义。