While on-going and future developments will likely increase the short-term elasticity of the electricity demand, capacity markets are often put forward as a possible remedy to ensure generation adequacy. In this paper, we provide a model formulation of a stochastic non-cooperative capacity planning problem reflecting short-term elastic energy demand, risk-averse investors, and a capacity market. The Conditional-Value-At-Risk is used as a coherent risk-measure. For solving the model, we deploy an Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers. We analyze the impact of short-term demand elasticity on the social welfare, agents’ surpluses, and Loss-of-Load-Expectation of an energy-only market and a market complemented by a capacity market. Moreover, we consider the impact of set capacity targets. For the energy-only market, we show that short-term demand elasticity even amplifies the negative effect of risk aversion on social welfare. A capacity market can be used to hedge against the negative effects of risk aversion, even if the capacity target is not set ideally. Furthermore, we show that a capacity market can be used to mitigate welfare transfer to investors and lower the loss-of-load-expectation induced by scarcity times.

虽然正在进行和未来的发展可能会增加电力需求的短期弹性，但容量市场通常被提出作为确保发电充足的可能补救措施。在本文中，我们提供了一个反映短期弹性能源需求、规避风险的投资者和容量市场的随机非合作容量规划问题的模型公式。Conditional-Value-At-Risk 被用作一个连贯的风险度量。为了求解模型，我们部署了乘法器的交替方向方法。我们分析了短期需求弹性对纯能源市场和以容量市场为补充的市场的社会福利、代理人盈余和负载预期损失的影响。此外，我们考虑了设定容量目标的影响。对于纯能源市场，我们表明，短期需求弹性甚至会放大风险规避对社会福利的负面影响。容量市场可用于对冲风险规避的负面影响，即使容量目标设定不理想。此外，我们表明容量市场可用于减轻向投资者的福利转移，并降低由稀缺时间引起的负载预期损失。