How do people distribute defenses over a directed network attack graph, where they must defend a critical node? This question is of interest to computer scientists, information technology and security professionals. Decision-makers are often subject to behavioral biases that cause them to make sub-optimal defense decisions, which can prove especially costly if the critical node is an essential infrastructure. We posit that non-linear probability weighting is one bias that may lead to sub-optimal decision-making in this environment, and provide an experimental test. We find support for this conjecture, and also identify other empirically important forms of biases such as naive diversification and preferences over the spatial timing of the revelation of an overall successful defense. The latter preference is related to the concept of anticipatory feelings induced by the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.

人们如何在有向网络攻击图上分布防御，他们必须在那里防御关键节点？这个问题对计算机科学家、信息技术和安全专业人员很感兴趣。决策者经常受到行为偏见的影响，导致他们做出次优的防御决策，如果关键节点是必不可少的基础设施，这可能会特别昂贵。我们假设非线性概率加权是一种可能导致在这种环境下做出次优决策的偏差，并提供了一个实验测试。我们找到了对这一猜想的支持，并确定了其他经验上重要的偏见形式，例如天真多样化和对整体成功防御的揭示的空间时间的偏好。