The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying explanation is available of how one can have true ontological beliefs, given that the relevant belief-forming methods are noncausal (for example, not perception based or memory based). This paper first presents a version of the reliability challenge against realist approaches to ontology, put forward by Jared Warren. It then explores a response to the challenge on behalf of the realist that appeals to the use of abduction. This response does not satisfactorily deal with the reliability challenge, though, and even leads to a further epistemic impasse. At this point, a version of ontological pluralism is presented, according to which all the competing theories in a certain ontological dispute can be true—in a sense of “true” to be articulated. The final step shows how this version of pluralism deals with the reliability challenge, especially with the complaint that we lack an explanation for our true ontological beliefs.

中文翻译：

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本体论分歧、可靠性和对峙：多元主义选择

本体论的可靠性挑战可以概括为这样一种抱怨：鉴于相关的信念形成方法是非因果关系，对于如何拥有真正的本体论信念没有令人满意的解释（例如，不是基于感知或基于记忆的）。本文首先介绍了 Jared Warren 提出的针对本体论现实主义方法的可靠性挑战的一个版本。然后它代表现实主义者探索了对使用绑架的挑战的回应。然而，这种回应并不能令人满意地应对可靠性挑战，甚至导致进一步的认知僵局。在这一点上，出现了一种本体论多元论，据此，在某种本体论争论中，所有相互竞争的理论都可以是真实的——在被阐明的“真实”的意义上。最后一步展示了这个版本的多元主义如何应对可靠性挑战，尤其是抱怨我们缺乏对真实本体论信念的解释。