ABSTRACT

In this paper, I identify an important epistemic problem with the practice of racial profiling. Racial profiling relies on naked statistical evidence to justify reasonable suspicion. Naked statistical evidence refers to probabilities that are not created by a particular case, but that existed prior to or independently of the case under consideration (Wells, 1992). I argue that naked statistical evidence cannot justify outright belief in someone’s worthiness of suspicion, it can only justify a high credence. This is because statistical evidence fails to be causally connected to the particular case under consideration. According to our blame norms, a precondition for apt blame is that an agent has an outright belief that the agent is responsible for the act for which they are blamed; high credence cannot play this role. I argue that reasonable suspicion in the context of racial profiling frequently involves blame such that it demands the same strict evidential standards. Therefore, we can identify an important epistemic objection to this practice.

摘要

在本文中，我确定了种族定性实践的一个重要认知问题。种族定性依赖于赤裸裸的统计证据来证明合理怀疑的合理性。裸统计证据是指不是由特定案例创造的概率，而是在考虑的案例之前或独立于所考虑的案例而存在的概率（Wells，1992）。我认为，赤裸裸的统计证据不能证明完全相信某人值得怀疑是合理的，它只能证明高度信任是合理的。这是因为统计证据无法与所考虑的特定案例有因果关系。根据我们的责备规范，适当责备的前提是代理人完全相信代理人应对他们被责备的行为负责；高可信度不能起到这个作用。我认为，在种族定性的背景下，合理的怀疑经常涉及责备，因此它需要同样严格的证据标准。因此，我们可以确定对这种做法的一个重要的认识论反对意见。