Abstract

Sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provide that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures to ensure the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights including, housing and social security. The executive is generally responsible for the implementation of these rights. However, a core challenge in South Africa is that the executive is beset by chronic incapacity, especially at provincial and local government levels, which has hindered the realisation of socio-economic rights. This article investigates the increasingly intrusive orders by the judiciary to address this problem; these orders include, specifically, appointing bodies to manage service delivery by the executive. I will situate these mechanisms within the broader powers of the judiciary and provide a justification for them, under particular conditions, against criticisms of judicial overreach. In engaging with their legal justifiability, I will analyse recent South African case law as well as examples from India and Colombia so as to highlight that the South Africa judiciary is not unique in developing such mechanisms. In concluding, I identify the conditions under which the deployment of these mechanisms may be considered justifiable as well as their value in advancing the realisation of socio-economic rights in South Africa.

摘要

1996 年南非共和国宪法第 26(2) 和 27(2) 条规定，国家必须采取合理的立法和其他措施，以确保逐步实现包括住房和社会保障在内的社会经济权利。行政部门通常负责实施这些权利。然而，南非的一个核心挑战是行政部门长期缺乏能力，特别是在省和地方政府层面，这阻碍了社会经济权利的实现。本文调查了司法部门为解决这一问题而发出的越来越具有侵入性的命令；这些命令具体包括任命机构来管理行政部门提供的服务。我将把这些机制置于司法部门更广泛的权力范围内，并在特定条件下为它们提供理由，反对对司法越权的批评。在探讨它们的法律正当性时，我将分析最近的南非判例法以及来自印度和哥伦比亚的例子，以强调南非司法机构在发展此类机制方面并不是独一无二的。最后，我确定了在何种条件下部署这些机制可能被认为是合理的，以及它们在促进南非实现社会经济权利方面的价值。我将分析最近的南非判例法以及来自印度和哥伦比亚的例子，以强调南非司法机构在发展此类机制方面并不是独一无二的。最后，我确定了在何种条件下部署这些机制可能被认为是合理的，以及它们在促进南非实现社会经济权利方面的价值。我将分析最近的南非判例法以及来自印度和哥伦比亚的例子，以强调南非司法机构在发展此类机制方面并不是独一无二的。最后，我确定了在何种条件下部署这些机制可能被认为是合理的，以及它们在促进南非实现社会经济权利方面的价值。