Executive term limits are evidently under stress in many jurisdictions. One mode in which they are evaded is through the formal revision or abrogation of a constitution. Such a process accelerates a pernicious cycle in which constitutional non-compliance begets constitutional instability, which in turn begets subsequent non-compliance. Such a non-compliance cycle is a core problem in law, and one that deserves more careful examination in various domains. This essay unearths original historical evidence of term-limit provisions and executive tenure in an effort to illuminate and evaluate the phenomenon. A background concern is that of international (and domestic) approaches to term-limit evasion. One intellectual response is that of militant democracy. The logic of that approach would imply the entrenchment and protection of term limits, which would presumably disrupt the cycle of non-compliance.

在许多司法管辖区，行政任期限制显然受到压力。规避它们的一种方式是通过正式修改或废除宪法。这样的过程加速了一个恶性循环，在这种循环中，不遵守宪法会导致宪法不稳定，进而导致随后的不遵守。这种不合规周期是法律中的核心问题，值得在各个领域进行更仔细的审查。本文挖掘了任期限制条款和行政任期的原始历史证据，以阐明和评估这一现象。一个背景问题是国际（和国内）逃避期限限制的方法。一种理智的反应是激进的民主. 这种方法的逻辑意味着对任期限制的巩固和保护，这可能会破坏不遵守的循环。