This paper studies sectoral balance sheet dynamics when a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is first introduced into an economy, and when there is an attempt at a large-scale run out of bank deposits into CBDC. We find that if the introduction of CBDC follows a set of conservative core principles, bank funding is not necessarily reduced, credit and liquidity provision to the private sector need not contract, and the risk of a system-wide run from bank deposits to CBDC is addressed. In addition, under these core principles CBDC can be expected to trade at par with other types of money in all but the most extreme situations. The core principles are: (i) CBDC pays an adjustable interest rate; (ii) CBDC and reserves are distinct, and not guaranteed to be directly convertible into each other at the central bank; (iii) no guaranteed convertibility of bank deposits into CBDC at commercial banks (and therefore by implication at the central bank); (iv) the central bank guarantees to issue CBDC only against eligible securities. The final two principles imply that households and firms can freely trade bank deposits against CBDC in a private market, and that the private market can freely obtain additional CBDC from the central bank against eligible securities.

本文研究了首次将中央银行数字货币 (CBDC) 引入经济体时，以及尝试将银行存款大规模用完 CBDC 时的部门资产负债表动态。我们发现，如果 CBDC 的引入遵循一套保守的核心原则，银行资金不一定会减少，对私营部门的信贷和流动性提供也不一定会减少，银行存款到 CBDC 的全系统挤兑风险为解决。此外，在这些核心原则下，除了最极端的情况外，CBDC 有望与其他类型的货币进行同等交易。核心原则是：(i) CBDC 支付可调整的利率；(ii) CBDC 和储备是不同的，并且不保证在中央银行可以直接相互转换；(iii) 商业银行没有保证银行存款可兑换为 CBDC（因此暗示在中央银行）；(iv) 中央银行保证仅针对符合条件的证券发行 CBDC。最后两个原则意味着，家庭和企业可以在私人市场上自由地将银行存款与 CBDC 进行交易，并且私人市场可以自由地从中央银行获得额外的 CBDC 以兑现符合条件的证券。