Non-epistemic values pervade climate modelling, as is now well documented and widely discussed in the philosophy of climate science. Recently, Parker and Winsberg have drawn attention to what can be termed “epistemic inequality”: this is the risk that climate models might more accurately represent the future climates of the geographical regions prioritised by the values of the modellers. In this paper, we promote value management as a way of overcoming epistemic inequality. We argue that value management can be seriously considered as soon as the value-free ideal and inductive risk arguments commonly used to frame the discussions of value influence in climate science are replaced by alternative social accounts of objectivity. We consider objectivity in Longino's sense as well as strong objectivity in Harding's sense to be relevant options here, because they offer concrete proposals that can guide scientific practice in evaluating and designing so-called multi-model ensembles and, in fine, improve their capacity to quantify and express uncertainty in climate projections.

非认知价值遍及气候建模，正如现在在气候科学哲学中得到充分记录和广泛讨论的那样。最近，Parker 和 Winsberg 引起了人们对所谓“认知不平等”的关注：这是气候模型可能更准确地代表建模者价值观优先考虑的地理区域未来气候的风险。在本文中，我们提倡将价值管理作为克服认知不平等的一种方式。我们认为，一旦通常用于框架气候科学中价值影响讨论的无价值理想和归纳风险论点被客观性的替代社会账户所取代，就可以认真考虑价值管理。我们考虑 Longino 意义上的客观性以及 Harding 的强烈客观性总之，提高他们在气候预测中量化和表达不确定性的能力。