The analytical notions of ‘thought style’, ‘paradigm’, ‘episteme’ and ‘style of reasoning’ are some of the most popular frameworks in the history and philosophy of science. Although their proponents, Ludwik Fleck, Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Ian Hacking, are all part of the same philosophical tradition that closely connects history and philosophy, the extent to which they share similar assumptions and objectives is still under debate. In the first part of the paper, I shall argue that, despite the fact that these four thinkers disagree on certain assumptions, their frameworks have the same explanatory goal – to understand how objectivity is possible. I shall present this goal as a necessary element of a common project -- that of historicising Kant's a priori. In the second part of the paper, I shall make an instrumental use of the insights of these four thinkers to form a new model for studying objectivity. I shall also propose a layered diagram that allows the differences between the frameworks to be mapped, while acknowledging their similarities. This diagram will show that the frameworks of style of reasoning and episteme illuminate conditions of possibility that lie at a deeper level than those considered by thought styles and paradigms.

“思维方式”、“范式”、“认识论”和“推理方式”等分析概念是科学史和科学哲学中一些最流行的框架。尽管他们的支持者路德维克·弗莱克、托马斯·库恩、米歇尔·福柯和伊恩·哈金都是将历史与哲学紧密联系在一起的同一哲学传统的一部分，但他们在多大程度上共享相似的假设和目标仍在争论中。在论文的第一部分，我将论证，尽管这四位思想家在某些假设上存在分歧，但他们的框架具有相同的解释性目标——理解客观性是如何可能的。我将把这个目标作为一个共同计划的必要元素——将康德的先验历史化。在论文的第二部分，我将充分利用这四位思想家的见解，形成研究客观性的新模式。我还将提出一个分层图，允许映射框架之间的差异，同时承认它们的相似性。该图将表明，推理风格和认识论的框架阐明了比思维风格和范式所考虑的更深层次的可能性条件。