Social science research on election violence shows that incumbents regularly turn to different nonstate armed groups to organize violence during elections, including ethnic militias, gangs, criminal organizations, and paramilitaries, among others. Less well known are the motivations of these different actors, what they seek to gain from election violence, and when they turn down incumbents’ overtures. From a practitioner perspective, understanding when armed groups supply election violence for incumbents is important because of the severe consequences of such acts, including economic hardship, forced displacement, damaged infrastructure, and costs to human life. The paper asks: under what conditions do armed groups agree or refuse to perpetrate election violence for incumbents? Drawing on most similar case studies of the Ijaw Youth Council and the O’odua People’s Congress in Nigeria, we find that internal armed group politics help to explain how these actors respond to incumbent governors’ demands for election violence. Specifically, groups divided by leadership rivalries agree to perpetrate election violence for incumbents whereas those with cohesive leadership refuse to do so. Leaders of rival factions accept money and arms from incumbents to try to eliminate their competitors, and in exchange, agree to organize violence during elections for their incumbent sponsors. In contrast, groups with cohesive leadership turn down incumbents’ overtures given the risks of cooptation and weakened community support. The findings contribute to our understanding of how election violence is co-produced by elites and nonstate armed groups by explaining the motivations and decisions of the latter. More broadly, the paper speaks to larger questions about security challenges in developing democracies. The findings also highlight the need for greater attention to interventions to prevent armed groups from engaging in election violence on behalf of political elites.

关于选举暴力的社会科学研究表明，在位者经常求助于不同的非国家武装团体在选举期间组织暴力，包括民族民兵、帮派、犯罪组织和准军事组织等。鲜为人知的是这些不同行为者的动机、他们试图从选举暴力中获得什么，以及他们何时拒绝现任者的提议。从从业者的角度来看，了解武装团体何时为现任者提供选举暴力很重要，因为此类行为会带来严重后果，包括经济困难、被迫流离失所、基础设施受损和人类生命代价。报纸问：武装团体在什么条件下同意或拒绝对现任者实施选举暴力？借鉴尼日利亚 Ijaw 青年委员会和 O'odua 人民代表大会的大多数类似案例研究，我们发现内部武装团体政治有助于解释这些行为者如何回应现任州长对选举暴力的要求。具体而言，被领导层竞争划分的团体同意为现任者实施选举暴力，而具有凝聚力的领导者则拒绝这样做。敌对派系的领导人从现任者那里接受金钱和武器，试图消灭他们的竞争对手，作为交换，他们同意在选举期间为他们的现任赞助者组织暴力活动。相比之下，考虑到合并的风险和削弱的社区支持，具有凝聚力领导的团体拒绝了现任者的提议。通过解释精英和非国家武装团体的动机和决定，这些发现有助于我们了解选举暴力是如何由精英和非国家武装团体共同制造的。更广泛地说，本文讨论了有关发展中民主国家安全挑战的更大问题。调查结果还强调需要更多地关注干预措施，以防止武装团体代表政治精英参与选举暴力。