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Can you catch two birds with one stone? The impacts of nominating committee composition on board monitoring on resource provision
Long Range Planning ( IF 7.4 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-22 , DOI: 10.1016/j.lrp.2021.102127
Wei Shen , Yuliya Ponomareva , Timur Uman

While it has long been recognized that boards of directors perform two primary functions – monitoring and resource provision – little research has systematically examined the relationship between these two functions in public corporations. Given the growing external emphasis on the monitoring function by investors and advocates of corporate governance reforms, it is important to understand how such an emphasis impacts the resource provision function. In addition to identifying the composition of the nominating committee as a key to understanding the relationship, we propose two mechanisms through which the formation of an independent nominating committee in response to the external emphasis on monitoring leads to a decline in board resource provision. One mechanism is through a decline in information sharing between top managers and the nominating committee in new director selection, which results in a divergence between board capital and the firm's specific resource needs. The other is through decreased trust between the CEO and the board, which results in a less collaborative CEO-board relationship. To alleviate this negative impact that an external emphasis on monitoring has on resource provision, we propose that boards can bring non-CEO executives back onto nominating committees as inside directors. Our theoretical analysis contributes to the understanding of how the composition of the nominating committee influences board monitoring and resource provision, and has important implications for corporate governance research and practices.



中文翻译:

一块石头能捉两只鸟吗?提名委员会组成对董事会监督资源供应的影响

尽管人们早就认识到董事会履行两项主要职能——监督和资源提供——但很少有研究系统地研究上市公司这两项职能之间的关系。鉴于投资者和公司治理改革的倡导者越来越强调外部监督功能,了解这种强调如何影响资源提供功能非常重要。除了将提名委员会的组成确定为理解关系的关键之外,我们还提出了两种机制,通过这些机制形成独立的提名委员会以应对外部对监督的重视,从而导致董事会资源供应下降。一种机制是通过高层管理人员和提名委员会在新董事选举中信息共享的减少,导致董事会资本与公司特定资源需求之间的分歧。另一个原因是 CEO 与董事会之间的信任度下降,导致 CEO 与董事会之间的合作减少。为了减轻外部强调监督对资源供应的负面影响,我们建议董事会可以将非 CEO 高管重新带回提名委员会作为内部董事。我们的理论分析有助于理解提名委员会的组成如何影响董事会监督和资源提供,并对公司治理研究和实践具有重要意义。这导致董事会资本与公司特定资源需求之间的分歧。另一个原因是 CEO 与董事会之间的信任度下降,导致 CEO 与董事会之间的合作减少。为了减轻外部强调监督对资源供应的负面影响,我们建议董事会可以将非 CEO 高管重新带回提名委员会作为内部董事。我们的理论分析有助于理解提名委员会的组成如何影响董事会监督和资源提供,并对公司治理研究和实践具有重要意义。这导致董事会资本与公司特定资源需求之间的分歧。另一个原因是 CEO 与董事会之间的信任度下降,导致 CEO 与董事会之间的合作减少。为了减轻外部强调监督对资源供应的负面影响,我们建议董事会可以将非 CEO 高管重新带回提名委员会作为内部董事。我们的理论分析有助于理解提名委员会的组成如何影响董事会监督和资源提供,并对公司治理研究和实践具有重要意义。这导致 CEO 与董事会之间的协作性降低。为了减轻外部强调监督对资源供应的负面影响,我们建议董事会可以将非 CEO 高管重新带回提名委员会作为内部董事。我们的理论分析有助于理解提名委员会的组成如何影响董事会监督和资源提供,并对公司治理研究和实践具有重要意义。这导致 CEO 与董事会之间的协作性降低。为了减轻外部强调监督对资源供应的负面影响,我们建议董事会可以将非 CEO 高管重新带回提名委员会作为内部董事。我们的理论分析有助于理解提名委员会的组成如何影响董事会监督和资源提供,并对公司治理研究和实践具有重要意义。

更新日期:2021-06-22
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