A philosophically and historically influential section of the Critique of Judgement presents an ‘intuitive intellect’ as a mind whose representation is limited to what actually exists, and does not extend to mere possibilities. Kant’s paradigmatic instance of such an intellect is however also the divine mind. This combination threatens to rule out the reality of the mere possibilities presupposed by Kant’s theory of human freedom. Through an analysis of the relevant issues in metaphysical cosmology, modal metaphysics and philosophical theology, I show that Kant in fact possesses the resources to reconcile the philosophical claims of §76 of the Critique of Judgement with his keystone commitment to the reality of human freedom.

中文翻译：

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替代的可能性、神圣的无所不知和对判断的批判§76

具有哲学和历史影响力的部分判断力批判将“直觉的智力”呈现为一种思想，其表现仅限于实际存在的事物，而不仅仅延伸到可能性。然而，康德对这种智力的典型例子也是神圣的头脑。这种结合有可能排除康德人类自由理论所预设的纯粹可能性的现实。通过对形而上学宇宙学、模态形而上学和哲学神学的相关问题的分析，我表明康德实际上拥有调和第 76 条哲学主张的资源。判断力批判以他对人类自由现实的基石承诺。