Management incentives for engaging and excelling in corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance is an important theme as business sustainability gains momentum. We examine the role of tournament incentives, which are created by competition among non-CEO (chief executive officer) senior executives (vice presidents [VPs]) for promotion to the CEO position, in firms’ CSR performance. Using a sample of U.S. Standard & Poor (S&P) 1500 firms from 1993 to 2014, we find that tournament incentives proxied by pay gaps between CEOs and VPs are negatively associated with CSR performance, suggesting that competition for promotion could be detrimental for CSR performance. We further show that such association is more pronounced when the perceived probability of promotion increases prior to CEO turnover. This article provides policy, practical, and education implications and contribute to the literature on the integration of CSR into the business culture and strategic management processes.

随着企业可持续发展势头的增强，激励管理人员参与并超越企业社会责任 (CSR) 绩效是一个重要主题。我们研究了由非 CEO（首席执行官）高级管理人员（副总裁 [VP]）之间竞争晋升到 CEO 职位而产生的锦标赛激励在公司 CSR 绩效中的作用。使用 1993 年至 2014 年美国标准普尔 (S&P) 1500 家公司的样本，我们发现以 CEO 和 VP 之间的薪酬差距为代表的锦标赛激励与企业社会责任绩效呈负相关，表明晋升竞争可能不利于企业社会责任绩效。我们进一步表明，当在 CEO 更替之前感知到的晋升概率增加时，这种关联更加明显。本文提供了政策、实践、