This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the supervisor and agent may collude. I show that the principal optimally delegates the interaction with the agent to the supervisor if either the supervisor's budget is large or the value of production is small. The principal prefers direct communication with the supervisor and agent if the supervisor's budget is sufficiently small and the value of production is high.

中文翻译：

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信息控制下的串通和委托

本文研究了信息控制如何影响委托-监督-代理关系中的共谋动机和最佳组织结构。我考虑了一个模型，其中委托人根据生产代理人的私人信息设计监管者的信号，监管者和代理人可能串通。我表明，如果主管的预算很大或生产价值很小，则委托人将与代理人的交互最佳地委托给主管。如果主管的预算足够小且生产价值很高，则委托人更喜欢与主管和代理人直接沟通。