We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data from five published papers on static, dynamic, and auction games. NLK provides different predictions than those of the NE and Level-K; moreover, a simple version of NLK explains the experimental data better in many cases, with the same or lower number of parameters. We discuss extensions to games with more than two players and heterogeneous beliefs.

中文翻译：

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将 Level-K 与纳什均衡联系起来

我们介绍了 NLK，这是一种连接纳什均衡 (NE) 和 Level-K 的模型。它允许游戏中的玩家相信她的对手可能不如她那样成熟，也可能与心理学支持的观点一样复杂。我们将 NLK 应用于有关静态、动态和拍卖游戏的五篇已发表论文的数据。NLK 提供与 NE 和 Level-K 不同的预测；此外，NLK 的简单版本在许多情况下可以更好地解释实验数据，参数数量相同或更少。我们讨论了对具有两个以上玩家和异质信念的游戏的扩展。