Abstract

Effective verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement is an endeavor for which a solution is widely sought, but also one which poses numerous challenges, such as protection of information and safety and security of warheads and components. Some or all of these challenges could be influenced by the nature of the hosting dismantlement facility. We have developed a systems engineering approach for use in assessing this aspect of the dismantlement verification problem. We have used the methodology to evaluate which of four broad classes of facilities would be most favorable for verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads: a nuclear warhead facility engaged in active stockpile work, a nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work, a converted industrial facility, and a purpose-designed dedicated dismantlement facility. The analysis is based on the level of challenge involved in implementing verified dismantlement, with respect to five key areas: Verification, Confidentiality, Safety, Security, and Compatibility with the overall nuclear warhead reductions regime. Using our method we find the option of the existing nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work to be most favorable. On initial consideration, a dedicated dismantlement facility turns out to be the least favorable. This outcome is related to Compatibility and depends on the importance of making a dedicated dismantlement facility available in the same time frame as an existing nuclear warhead facility. If this criterion is relaxed, the dedicated dismantlement facility instead becomes the most favorable option. Verification, Confidentiality and Security have less impact on the overall outcome.

摘要

核弹头拆除的有效核查是一项广泛寻求​​解决方案的努力，但也提出了许多挑战，例如信息保护以及弹头和部件的安全和安保。部分或所有这些挑战可能会受到托管拆除设施性质的影响。我们开发了一种系统工程方法，用于评估拆除验证问题的这一方面。我们已经使用该方法来评估四大类设施中的哪一种最有利于核弹头的核查拆除：从事现役储存工作的核弹头设施、目前未用于现役储存工作的核弹头设施、改造后的工业设施，以及专门设计的专用拆除设施。该分析基于实施经核查的拆除所涉及的挑战水平，涉及五个关键领域：核查、保密、安全、安保以及与总体核弹头削减制度的兼容性。使用我们的方法，我们发现当前未用于现役储存工作的现有核弹头设施的选择是最有利的。在最初的考虑中，一个专门的拆除设施被证明是最不利的。这一结果与兼容性有关，并取决于在与现有核弹头设施相同的时间框架内提供专用拆除设施的重要性。如果放宽这个标准，专用的拆除设施反而成为最有利的选择。确认，