We report the results from an experiment inspired by a seminal study (Staw, 1976) that introduced the notion of “escalation of commitment”, a variant of the sunk cost fallacy. This topic has received much attention outside of economics, and we investigate whether the escalation phenomenon can be reproduced using standard protocols established in experimental economics. The focus is on how decision makers respond to a signal about a previous investment depending on (i) whether or not they were responsible for that investment, (ii) whether the signal is positive or negative, and (iii) whether or not the signal is associated with a loss or gain. We characterize theoretical conditions under which escalation—increased follow-up investments after receiving a negative signal—may occur. Our data indicates that subjects react differently to negative feedback when this feedback is linked to a financial loss and when they have been responsible for the initial investment. We also observe gender effects.

我们报告了一项受开创性研究（Staw，1976）启发的实验结果，该研究引入了“承诺升级”的概念，这是沉没成本谬误的一种变体。这个话题在经济学之外受到了很多关注，我们研究了是否可以使用实验经济学中建立的标准协议来重现升级现象。重点是决策者如何回应有关先前投资的信号取决于 (i) 他们是否对该投资负责，(ii) 信号是积极的还是消极的，以及 (iii) 信号是否与损失或收益有关。我们描述了可能发生升级（在收到负面信号后增加后续投资）的理论条件。我们的数据表明，当这种反馈与经济损失有关以及当他们对初始投资负责时，受试者对负面反馈的反应不同。我们还观察到性别影响。